Make Campaign Coverage Great Again: Presidential Campaigns, the  Press, and the Right of Access by Mescall, Maximilian J.
MESCALL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/25/2018 5:37 PM 
 
1653 
MAKE CAMPAIGN COVERAGE GREAT AGAIN: 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS, THE PRESS, AND THE RIGHT 
OF ACCESS 
Maximilian J. Mescall* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As news organizations multiply and cater to niche fields and interests, 
Americans have flocked towards news sources that fit their ideological 
preferences.1  For instance, eighty-eight percent of consistent conservatives 
have a positive view of Fox News, while consistent liberals are more likely 
to rely on NPR, PBS, the New York Times or the BBC for their news.2  
Although more Americans follow the news, the public has moved away from 
television and print mediums, where news sources attempt to appeal to a 
broader audience, to blogs or ideologically consistent television such as the 
O’Reilly or Daily Show.3  Meanwhile, on social media, consistent 
conservatives and consistent liberals are more likely to defriend or unfollow 
people who share political views contrary to their own.4  This shift in 
American news consumption results in fewer Americans receiving news 
from multiple sources or viewpoints.5 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2014, 
Rutgers University.  I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, Jonathan 
Hafetz, for his guidance and support in the writing of this Comment.  
 1  Today’s Washington Press Corps More Digital, Specialized D.C.-based Newspaper 
Staff Focus on Congress, but Wire Services Account for Most of What Readers See, 
PEWRESEARCH (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.journalism.org/2015/12/03/todays-washington-
press-corps-more-digital-specialized/. 
 2  Amy Mitchell et al., Political Polarization & Media Habits, PEWRESEARCH (Oct. 21, 
2014), http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/. 
 3  Americans Spending More Time Following the News: Ideological News Sources: Who 
Watches and Why, PEWRESEARCH (Sept. 12, 2010), http://www.people-press.org/2010/09/12/
americans-spending-more-time-following-the-news/. 
 4  Mitchell, supra note 2. 
 5  Id. (“When it comes to getting news about politics and government, liberals and 
conservatives inhabit different worlds.  There is little overlap in the news sources they turn to 
and trust.”).  But see id. (“The study also suggests that in America today, it is virtually 
impossible to live in an ideological bubble.  Most Americans rely on an array of outlets—
with varying audience profiles—for political news.  And many consistent conservatives and 
liberals hear dissenting political views in their everyday lives.”). 
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This ideological split bled into the 2016 presidential campaign.  At a 
rally for Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, campaign staff approached 
Ben Schreckinger, a Politico reporter, called security, and escorted him from 
the premises.6  Schreckinger had obtained an admission ticket to the event, 
but had not been granted the press credentials7 he requested.8  The story was 
a common one in the 2016 presidential election, with the Trump campaign 
expelling reporters from Vice News,9 Univision,10 the Washington Post,11 
and other news outlets from campaign events.12 
The Trump campaign’s actions were the result of a blacklist of news 
organizations the campaign believed treated Trump unfairly.13  After the 
editorial board of The Des Moines Register called for then-candidate Trump 
to bow out of the race, it became the first media outlet placed on the 
blacklist.14  From there, the list expanded to at least half a dozen news 
organizations that were denied the access and privileges that come with press 
credentials, including access to the campaign’s news conferences.15  Some 
 
 6  Ben Schreckinger, Trump Security Removes POLITICO Reporter from Rally, POLTICO 
(June 3, 2016, 12:50 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-trump-security-
politico-reporter-223856. 
 7   Jeffrey P. Hermes et al., Who Gets a Press Pass? Media Credentialing Practices in 
the United States, BERKMAN CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y, June 2014, https://papers.ssrn.com/so
l3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2451239 (“For decades, journalists at established news 
organizations have routinely applied for and been granted credentials by government bodies 
at the federal, state and local levels, from the White House all the way down to local police 
and fire departments.  Private organizations also often control access to other events, such as 
concerts, sporting events and political conventions.  Despite some unease and tensions, many 
reporters have maintained working relationships with these agencies and their officials.  Some 
media organizations have obtained a standing [sic], generic set of credentials that are used 
interchangeably by their reporters; in other cases, a press badge from a recognized news 
organization may prompt an informal ‘wave through’ by officials, allowing special access at 
accident scenes, government events, and other restricted areas.”).  
 8  Schreckinger, supra note 6. 
 9  Harper Neidig, Reporter Arrested at Trump Campaign Event, THE HILL (Sept. 17, 
2016 4:09 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/296477-reporter-arrest
ed-at-trump-campaign-stop. 
 10  Theodore Schleifer, Univision Anchor Ejected from Trump News Conference, CNN 
(Aug. 26, 2015, 11:52 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/25/politics/donald-trump-megyn-
kelly-iowa-rally/index.html. 
 11  Tom Kludt and Brian Stelter, Donald Trump Revokes Washington Post Press 
Credentials, CNN (June 14, 2016, 11:03 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/13/media/do
nald-trump-washington-post-credentials/index.html. 
 12  Tom Kludt and Brian Stelter,’The Blacklist’: Here Are the Media Outlets Banned by 
Donald Trump, CNN (June 14, 2016, 12:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/06/14/media/d
onald-trump-media-blacklist/. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Eliza Collins, Trump Ends Media Blacklist: ‘I Figure They Can’t Treat Me Any 
Worse!’, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2016, 12:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/polit
ics/onpolitics/2016/09/07/donald-trump-media-blacklist/89951650/. 
 15  Kludt, supra note 12. 
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media advocates expressed concern that blacklisting “could have a chilling 
effect on other outlets’ coverage of Trump,”16 while others believed the 
campaign was correct to punish these news organizations for their 
dishonesty.17  While the Trump campaign’s actions were well known and 
documented, other presidential candidates have also engaged in selective 
access.18 
The Supreme Court has found viewpoint discrimination problematic 
when the entity denying the press access is a government actor.19  Under the 
First Amendment, the Court has recognized the press’s right of access to 
government buildings, but for the past fifty years declined to further address 
the doctrine.20  The doctrine is meant to prevent government from providing 
selective access to members of the press or public who promote a certain 
viewpoint.21  It fosters open access to government and subjects it to scrutiny 
from its citizens.22 
Campaigns, however, have a special interest in promoting a certain 
viewpoint, namely, that their candidates would best represent the interests of 
the electorate.23  The history of granting press credentials access24 combined 
with the fact that campaigns are private actors meant there was no need to 
extend the constitutional right of access to presidential campaigns.25  In 
recent campaigns, the denial of press access, due to ideological differences 
and how Americans select news sources, has created a new need to expand 
the right of access.  While some may argue that other media outlets can 
 
 16  Id. 
 17  The O’Reilly Show, Bill O’Reilly Supports Trump’s Media Blacklist: ‘If Someone Is 
Being Dishonest . . .’ FOX NEWS (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82vGi
EkCLb8. 
 18  See Dylan Byers, Clinton Campaign Denies Access to Pool Reporter, POLTICO (June 
15, 2015, 9:27 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2015/06/clinton-campaign-
denies-access-to-pool-reporter-208839; Rachel Sklar, Obama’s Revenge: New Yorker 
Reporter Excluded from Press Plane for Overseas Trip, HUFFINGTON POST (July 28, 2008, 
5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/21/obamas-revenge-emnew-york_n_113
969.html. 
 19  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.  The 
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or 
the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”).  
 20  Luke M. Milligan, First Amendment Discussion Group: Rethinking Press Rights of 
Equal Access, 65 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1103, 1105 (2008). 
 21  Id. 
 22  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.  
 23  Michael D. Shear, For Both Campaigns, a Need to Control the Message, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/us/politics/for-romney-and-obama-a-
need-to-control-the-message.html (“There is almost nothing more valuable to a presidential 
campaign than controlling the message.”). 
 24  See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 25  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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republish an article of another journalist who was granted access, this 
argument is hollow.  By granting selective access, campaigns control the 
initial public perception of the event, thus undermining an ideologically 
opposite news source’s ability to provide a contrary interpretation.26  Since 
presidential campaigns are so integral to the American democratic process, 
courts should recognize a right to access for press following campaigns and 
protect against viewpoint discrimination.27 
This Comment will examine the right to access for members of the 
press to the general election campaigns of presidential candidates.  Part II of 
this Comment will briefly summarize the two leading interpretations of the 
Freedom of the Press Clause in the First Amendment.  Part III will argue that 
campaigns are necessary to the function of government and therefore 
constitute state actors subject to constitutional limitations.  Part IV will 
discuss the recognized right to access government buildings which the press 
currently enjoys.  Part V will lay out the “Enumerated Reasons Rule” which 
provides the courts with guidance for balancing the press’s and the 
campaign’s interests.  Part VI will conclude. 
II. ORDINARY OR EXTRAORDINARY PROTECTION: INTERPRETING THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
Unlike most constitutional amendments, the First Amendment has little 
historical or original understanding.28  The first Congress, which passed the 
amendment, maintained no records defining its terms nor held significant 
discussions concerning the amendment’s implementation.29  This has led the 
First Amendment generally, and the press clause specifically, to acquire an 
ambiguous nature subject to multiple interpretations.30  In this vacuum, two 
primary interpretations of the press clause have arisen.  The first, the Fourth 
Estate theory, contends that Congress created the press clause to provide 
special rights to journalists and reporters who would act as the People’s 
watchdog over the three branches of government.31  The second, the press-
as-a-technology theory, argues that the clause is meant to ensure ordinary 
 
 26  See Ilana Friedman, Where Public and Private Spaces Converge: Discriminatory 
Media Access to Government Information, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 285 (2006). 
 27  See Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The free press is the guardian 
of the public interest, and the independent judiciary is the guardian of the free press.  Thus, 
courts have a duty to conduct a thorough and searching review of any attempt to restrict public 
access.”). 
 28  Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, The First Amendment Originalism of Justices 
Brennan, Scalia and Thomas, 17 COMM. L. POL’Y 385, 390 (2012).  
 29  Id. (citing David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 
455, 485 (1983)). 
 30  Id. 
 31  See generally Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49 (2016) 
(arguing in favor of adoption of the Fourth Estate interpretation of the Press Clause). 
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citizens have a right to distribute their thoughts via publication that are 
ancillary to the First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech.32 
A. The Fourth Estate Interpretation 
In early American history, printing technology was limited to “a highly 
select group of people” who “served as gatekeepers by adhering to a 
developed set of ethical norms.”33  Some evidence suggests that the Founders 
were comfortable with providing special rights and access to members of the 
press.34  Low literacy rates, the costs of obtaining and maintaining a printing 
press and favorable tax treatment all imply that originally the press was an 
elite group meant to monitor government actions and inform the people of 
important events.35  In this role as gatekeepers, the press served as 
“purposeful actors in the political process, linking parties, voters, and the 
government together.”36  In today’s media, journalists continue to act as 
moderators, organizing the debate to provide the coherence and structure 
necessary for public consumption.37  Essentially, the Fourth Estate 
interpretation suggests that the Press Clause fulfilled a dual purpose: to 
provide the People with the ability to “express their sentiments regardless of 
the purpose or content” and to provide a “checking function—to examine the 
proceedings of government.”38 
The Fourth Estate’s interpretation of the press is not strictly limited to 
professional journalists.39  Instead, “the press clause of the First Amendment 
not only protects the ability of the press to speak, but also protects certain 
types of press behavior.”40  Like freedom of expression or freedom of 
religion, the individual receives protection from the First Amendment by 
 
 32  See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or For the Press 
as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012) (arguing the 
press-as-a-technology interpretation of the Press Clause is proper). 
 33  West, supra note 31, at 72. 
 34  Id.  
 35  Id. at 73–81. 
 36  Id. at 88 (citing JEFFERY L. PASLEY, “THE TYRANNY OF PRINTERS”: NEWSPAPER 
POLITICS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 3 (2001)). 
 37  Id. at 103 (“Mass communication without journalists resembles ‘a town meeting with 
no moderator and no agenda; freedom of speech may be maximized but to no common 
purpose.’”) (quoting Anderson, supra note 29, at 333). 
 38  West, supra note 31, at 66–67 (internal quotations omitted). 
 39  Benjamin Oliphant, Freedom of the Press as a Discrete Constitutional Guarantee, 59 
MCGILL L.J. 283, 302 (2013) (“Just as freedom of expression is afforded equally to all to the 
extent they are engaging in expression . . . freedom of the press should be available to all who 
are engaging in press-like activity—from the lonely pamphleteer or pajama-clad blogger to 
the institutional mainstream reporter.”). 
 40  Amy Jordan, The Right of Access: Is There a Better Fit than the First Amendment?, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 1349, 1361 (2004) (citing Jon Paul Dits, The Press Clause and Press 
Behavior: Revisiting the Implications of Citizenship, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 31 (2002)). 
MESCALL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/25/2018  5:37 PM 
1658 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1653 
acting with a certain purpose.41  Under this definition, intent, not action, 
separates the journalist from the public individual.42  Simply put, the 
journalist’s intent to distribute the information for public consumption, 
places him within the definition of, and provides him with the protection of, 
the Press Clause.43 
The Court has suggested that the press has unique powers and 
protections under the Press Clause.  Early in the 20th Century the Court 
recognized that “security of the freedom of the press requires that it should 
be exempt [from] restraint . . . .”44  It has recognized, under the First 
Amendment, “the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and 
measures of public men of every description which has not been confined to 
the strict limits of the common law” but seems to have extraordinary power.45  
Indeed, the Court has held that when it comes to criticism of public officials, 
newspapers are protected under the First Amendment.46  In addition to 
having certain privileges, the press is also subject to certain restraints.  For 
example, the Court found the Federal Communication Commission’s former 
fairness doctrine constitutional, which required broadcasters to provide 
candidates with equal airtime so that they may address voters directly.47  
Throughout history some Justices, including Justice Stewart48 and Justice 
Stevens,49 argued for this interpretation. 
 
 41  Oliphant, supra note 39, at 302. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. at 299–300 (“[A]nyone who is undertaking newsgathering activity with intent to 
publish or otherwise disseminate that information to the public.”). 
 44  Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931). 
 45  Id. at 718. (quoting James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1800), http://p
ress-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs24.html) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 46  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 280–81 (1964) (holding that a public 
official could not recover damages for libel from a newspaper without a showing of actual 
malice). 
 47  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969) (subjecting broadcasters to 
content neutral FCC regulation). 
 48  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“A corollary 
of the right to publish must be a right to gather news.”); Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (“[T]he Free Press Clause extends protection to an 
institution.”).  See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 571–72 (1978) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (“Protection of those sources is necessary to ensure that the press can fulfill its 
constitutionally designated function of informing the public . . . .”).  See also Timothy B. Dyk, 
Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 929–32 
(1992) (“Justice Stewart’s comments [about the press] touched off a fury of debate.”); 
Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add 
to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975). 
 49  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 413 n.57 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“In fact, the Free Press Clause might be turned against Justice 
SCALIA, for two reasons.  First, we learn from it that the drafters of the First Amendment 
did draw distinctions—explicit distinctions—between types of ‘speakers,’ or speech outlets 
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If the Court explicitly adopts this theory, then access to presidential 
campaigns becomes straightforward.50  Since the press has certain news-
gathering privileges, the right to obtain a press pass would be a natural 
extension of that privilege.  Lower courts need only be concerned with issues 
of viewpoint discrimination and prudential concerns.  The Fourth Estate 
argument, however, was never adopted by the Court.51  Instead, both the 
Supreme Court and lower courts have effectively adopted the press-as-a-
technology interpretation to the Press Clause.52 
B. The Press-As-A-Technology Interpretation 
The press-as-a-technology theory, like the Fourth Estate theory, is 
based upon the Founders’ understanding of the press as presented in colonial 
and post-independence America.53 
For instance, long before the adoption of the First Amendment, press 
protections included not only pamphlets, newspapers and articles, but also 
books, which do not always discuss the news.54  Early American case law 
supported the idea that the Press Clause applies to all persons; all persons 
benefited from its protections, not just an elite group.55  Additionally, 
scholars have argued it was unlikely the Founders intended to grant special 
rights to the press because political elites were more likely to grant rights to 
the public in its entirety rather than to a subclass of the population to which 
the elites did not generally belong.56  Overall, the argument asserts the 
 
or forms.  Second, the Court’s strongest historical evidence all relates to the Framers’ views 
on the press, yet while the Court tries to sweep this evidence into the Free Speech Clause, the 
Free Press Clause provides a more natural textual home.  The text and history highlighted by 
our colleagues suggests why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, might 
be able to claim special First Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds of ‘identity’-
based distinctions might be permissible after all.  Once one accepts that much, the intellectual 
edifice of the majority opinion crumbles.”) (internal citations omitted).  C.f. John Paul 
Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293 (1993) (arguing the First Amendment 
grants individuals immunity from government prosecution for rights which are expressly 
enumerated).  
 50  C.f. Dyk, supra note 48, at 941–44. 
 51  See infra text accompanying notes 52–62. 
 52  See, e.g., Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1291 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We 
agree with our sister circuits.  The protections of the First Amendment do not turn on whether 
the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities 
engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others’ writings, or 
tried to get both sides of a story.”). 
 53  Volokh, supra note 32, at 468–83. 
 54  Id. at 481 (“Copyright law at the [adoption of the First Amendment] covered books, 
maps, and charts, but not newspapers.  To talk about copyright law as even potentially 
related—however benignly—to the freedom of the press suggests that the freedom of the press 
was seen as applicable to books.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 55  Id. at 489–97. 
 56  Id. at 469. 
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Founders envisioned a press populated by citizen journalists, similar to 
today’s news bloggers, rather than professional journalists working for 
established media corporations.57 
Modern American case law appears to support this definition.  The 
Court has extended Press Clause protections to citizens distributing a single 
writing in addition to periodical news organizations.58  At times, the Court 
has explicitly declined to extend privileges to the institutional press, holding 
that the Constitution grants no special protections to the profession.59  
Described inversely, “[t]he general public has the same right of access as 
does the media.”60  Recently, the Court recognized the rise of Internet 
reporting as further support for treating individuals and the institutional press 
as one and the same under the First Amendment.61 
While both the Fourth Estate and press-as-a-technology theories appear 
viable, the Court has more consistently applied the latter in its interpretation 
of the Press Clause.62  Thus, any First Amendment right to access a campaign 
would apply not only to the institutional press, but the public at large. 
 
 
 57  C.f. Robert A. Arcamona, In This Issue, Cover Story Bloggers, Other Alternative 
Media, and Access to Press Conferences, 27 COMM. LAWYER 12 (2011) (discussing the 
difficulties citizen bloggers have when attempting to access government sources). 
 58  Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“The liberty of the press is not confined 
to newspapers and periodicals.  It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets . . . .  The press 
in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of 
information and opinion.”). 
 59  See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 n.8 (2001) (declining to extend protections 
to reporters who invaded privacy); Houchins v. KOED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1978) 
(refusing to grant the press special rights of access to prisons beyond that normally accorded 
to the public); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (“The Constitution does not, 
however, require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by 
members of the public generally.”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708–09 (1972) 
(denying reporters privilege in the context of grand jury investigations). 
 60  Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 788 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 61  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (“With the advent of the Internet 
and the decline of print and broadcast media . . . the line between the media and others who 
wish to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”). 
 62  See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (“[T]he history of the [Press] 
Clause does not suggest that the authors contemplated a ‘special’ or ‘institutional’ 
privilege.”).  But see Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 464 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Although the Free Press Clause does not guarantee the press a preferred position over other 
speakers, the Free Press Clause does ‘protec[t] [members of press] from invidious 
discrimination.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 
12-20, 963 (2d ed. 1988); Jordan, supra note 40, at 1351 (“In cases following Zemel [v. Rusk], 
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected [] the argument that the press enjoyed special privileges 
not enjoyed by average citizens . . . .”). 
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III. CAMPAIGNS AS STATE ACTORS 
Campaigns are an integral part of the American electoral system.63  
Without campaigns, the average person would not know a candidate’s 
politics, experience or character.64  Presidential campaigns also benefit from 
government protection and aid after a candidate is formally nominated at 
national party conventions.65  Since general election campaigns have become 
a necessary part of American democracy, presidential campaigns should be 
considered state actors subject to constitutional limitations.66 
A. The State Actor Test 
From its inception, the Court created the state actor test to balance 
“Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to 
enjoy freedom of press and religion . . . .”67  It explicitly emphasized that the 
freedoms of press and religion “occupy a preferred position” in our 
democracy.68  Therefore, when an entity becomes “so impregnated with a 
governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations 
placed upon state action” the entity is regulated by the Constitution.69 
The Supreme Court has held political parties to be state actors when 
acting in an electoral capacity.  In Nixon v. Condon, the Court addressed a 
Texas statute that allowed a party to restrict its primary elections to only 
white voters.70  The Court acknowledged that “a political party is merely a 
voluntary association . . . it has inherent power like voluntary associations 
generally to determine its own membership . . . .”71  The statute itself, 
however, empowered the party commission to determine rules as to who 
could vote in the primary process.72  By acting on this statutory authority, 
“[w]hatever power of exclusion has been exercised by the members of the 
committee has come to them . . . as the delegates of the State.”73  Declaring 
 
 63  See H. T. Reynolds, Coverage of Political Campaigns https://www1.udel.edu/htr/A
merican/Texts/campcov.html#note1 (“Those running for office must state their positions.  
Otherwise, there is no real choice and elections lose their meaning.”). 
 64  See id. 
 65  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 66  Although primary campaigns could conceivably be state actors subject to regulation, 
such discussion falls outside the scope of this Comment.  For an example of how courts have 
addressed the press and primary campaigns, see American Broadcasting Companies v. 
Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 67  Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). 
 68  Id. 
 69  Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1401 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding a political party was a 
state actor when it denied placement of a candidate on its ballot). 
 70  286 U.S. 73, 81 (1932).  
 71  Id. at 83. 
 72  Id. at 84.  
 73  Id. at 85. 
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the law unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
the Court concluded, “when those agencies are invested with an authority 
independent of the will of the association in whose name they undertake to 
speak, they become to that extent the organs of the State itself, the 
repositories of official power.”74  Holding thus, the Court reserved the 
question of whether a political party could restrict membership absent 
empowerment by a statute for a later date.75 
The Court answered that question in Terry v. Adams.76 There, a private 
political organization, the Jaybirds, denied African-Americans admission 
into its primaries.77  Unlike in Nixon,78 the Jaybird primary excluded black 
voters without any blessing from the state.79  Whoever won the Jaybird 
primary, however, typically won the later Democratic primary and the 
general election.80  As a result, “[t]he Democratic primary and the general 
election [had] become no more than the perfunctory ratifiers of the choice 
that has already been made . . . .”81  The Court reasoned that “[t]he Jaybird 
primary has become an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of the 
elective process that determines who shall rule and govern in the county.”82  
It therefore concluded that it was “immaterial that the state does not control 
that part of this elective process” and the Jaybirds could not deny African-
Americans the right to vote any more than the state itself could.83 
The Supreme Court’s most recent decision concerning state actors is 
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association.84  
There, a private athletic association regulated all high school interscholastic 
sports in the state of Tennessee.85  Though no law required schools to join 
the association or the association to accept all schools, it effectively had a 
monopoly on interscholastic sport in the state and was acknowledged by the 
state’s school board as the governing authority of interscholastic sports.86  
When the association suspended a member school, the aggrieved school 
argued the association violated its First Amendment rights.87 
 
 74  Id. at 88. 
 75  Id. at 83. 
 76  345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
 77  Id. at 463. 
 78  Nixon, 286 U.S. at 73. 
 79  Terry, 345 U.S. at 465–66. 
 80  Id.  
 81  Id. at 469. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. at 469–70. 
 84  531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
 85  Id. at 291–94. 
 86  Id.  
 87  Id. at 293. 
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The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he nominally private character 
of the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public 
institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and there is 
no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional standards 
to it.”88  In reaching that decision, the Court observed that the association’s 
membership was drawn entirely from public schools and that the state had 
effectively recognized the association as the sole interscholastic regulator in 
the state.89  It concluded that “[e]ntwinement will support a conclusion that 
an ostensibly private organization ought to be charged with a public 
character and judged by constitutional standards; entwinement to the degree 
shown here requires it.”90 
Certainly, campaigns meet this basic level of entwinement.  The 
Constitution itself provides for the “general strictures for the election of the 
President, such as the manner in which electors are to be chosen and the 
qualifications for the presidency.”91  On a governmental level, the 
Republican and Democratic parties “claim the membership and presumed 
loyalty of virtually every elected official in the federal government . . . .”92  
Since party members raise money, rally votes for candidates, appoint judges 
and review candidates before supporting their electoral bids, campaigns 
supported by these party structures are state actors.93 
Lower federal courts have created several tests to determine 
entwinement.94  One test in particular, the joint action,95 or symbolic 
relationship96 test, applies when the state “has so far insinuated itself into a 
position of interdependence” with a private actor that “it must be recognized 
as a joint participant in the challenged activity. . . .”97  Interdependence is a 
narrowly construed test.98  The private actor must be “an indispensable part 
 
 88  Id. at 298. 
 89  Id. at 299–301. 
 90  Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 302. 
 91  John D. Castiglione, Sign Here, Please: The First Amendment Implications of 
Requiring a Loyalty Oath for Admission to Political Events, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 345, 353 
(2006). 
 92  Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First 
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 2046 (2003). 
 93  See id.  
 94  Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2011) (action coerced by state); 
Gritton v. Disponett, 332 F. App’x 232, 237 (6th Cir. 2009) (nexus test); Kirtley v. Rainey, 
326 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (public function test); Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy 
Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220, 1126 (10th Cir. 2001) (state supervision and 
intent test). 
 95  Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1093. 
 96  Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1451 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 97  Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). 
 98  Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1451. 
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of a state project”99 and the state must “knowingly [accept] the benefits 
derived from unconstitutional behavior.”100  In essence, the private entity 
must be a “willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.”101 
B. The Campaigns as State Actors 
While political parties are not always considered state actors,102 
presidential campaigns are so integral to the electoral process that they 
should be bound by the Constitution.  Even if they are technically private 
associations, presidential campaigns interact with various levels of 
government.  These interactions are mutually beneficial and satisfy the joint 
action test. 
The most relevant examples of a mutually beneficial relationship are 
seen in the Federal Election Campaign Act,103 the Presidential Election 
Campaign Fund Act104 and the Presidential Primary Matching Payment 
Account Act,105 which are all enforced by the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC).106  Under all of these acts, campaigns receive money from the federal 
government in exchange for some regulation.107  For instance, the FEC 
provides federal funds to campaigns while also placing limits on donations 
that campaigns can obtain from private donors.108  Once parties nominate 
their presidential candidates, those candidates have the opportunity to 
receive that government funding.109  General federal elections are therefore 
subject to oversight from the government.110 
 
 
 
 
 99  Id.  
 100  Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 101  Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). 
 102  C.f. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 69 (1990) (holding that political 
patronage to members of the same party violates due process).  
 103  52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146 (2012); Bipartisan Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 104  26 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9013 (2012). 
 105  26 U.S.C. §§ 9031–9042 (2012). 
 106  Castiglione, supra note 91, at 353. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Contribution Limits For 2015–2016 Federal Elections, FEC (Feb. 2015), http://www.
fec.gov/pages/brochures/contrib.shtml#Chart. 
 109  Presidential Election Campaign Fund, FEC (May 13, 2016), http://www.fec.gov/pre
ss/bkgnd/fund.shtml. 
 110  Campaign Guide for Congressional Candidates and Committees, FEC 20 (2014), 
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/candgui.pdf (“A candidate is entitled to an election limit only if he or 
she seeks office in that election.  Thus, a candidate who loses the primary (or otherwise does 
not participate in the general election) does not have a separate limit for the general.”). 
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In addition, the federal government regulates broadcasters to ensure 
that each candidate has access to television time.111  Federal law “provides 
that where a radio or television station permits a legally qualified candidate 
for public office to use its facilities, that station must also afford equal 
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office.”112  Though this 
does not automatically grant presidential candidates access to the airwaves 
(candidates must pay for the time they use), these regulations ensure that 
campaigns have an equal opportunity to reach voters.113 
In addition to monetary and broadcasting support, presidential 
campaigns receive security services directly from federal and state 
governments.  In presidential campaigns, the candidates’ personal security is 
handled by the Secret Service114 while state and local police coordinate 
security at campaign rallies and fundraising events.115  When candidates hold 
town halls, rallies or speeches, municipal governments often bear some of 
the costs necessary to secure the event.116 
Undoubtedly, elections are a critical part of the democratic 
experience,117 and various federal and state entities and the campaigns 
 
 111  John Stewart Fleming, Renewing the Chase: The First Amendment, Campaign 
Advertisements and the Goal of an Informed Citizenry, 87 IND. L. J. 767, 778–89 (2012) 
(discussing government regulation of broadcast media to allow equal access to airwaves by 
all candidates).  See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (“[Without 
regulation] [s]tation owners and a few networks would have unfettered power to make time 
available only to the highest bidders, to communicate only their own views on public issues, 
people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed.”); see also 
Marvin Ammori, The First Amendment and Mass Communication, 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
263 (2014) (arguing the Internet can be regulated under the free speech doctrine). 
 112  Russell J. Davis, Political Candidate’s Right to Equal Broadcast Time Under 47 
U.S.C.A. § 315, 35 A.L.R. Fed. 856, 2a (2016). 
 113  Id. 
 114  18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)(7) (2012) (“Under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the United States Secret Service is authorized to protect the following persons . . . 
Major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates and, within 120 days of the general 
Presidential election, the spouses of such candidates.”). 
 115  See David Leventhal, Police Want Presidential Candidates to Pay Bills, JOURNAL 
SENTINEL, http://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2017/01/11/police-want-
presidential-candidates-pay-bills/96447570/; Joshua Stewart, Trump’s Trip to San Diego Cost 
Taxpayers $460K, THE SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (July 22, 2016), http://www.sandieg
ouniontribune.com/news/politics/sdut-trumps-trip-to-san-diego-cost-taxpayers-460-2016jul2
2-story.html; Dominic Dezzutti, The Price of Political Rallies, CBS (Feb. 17, 2012, 12:31 
AM), http://denver.cbslocal.com/2012/02/17/the-price-of-political-rallies/.  See also Jordyn 
Phelps, Who Pays When the President Travels for Campaign Events?, ABC NEWS (July 25, 
2016, 7:44 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/pays-president-travels-campaign-events/sto
ry?id=40361545.  C.f. Jane C. Timm, Taxpayers Foot Bill for 2016 Campaign Security, 
MSNBC (June, 29, 2015, 2:14 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/taxpayers-foot-bill-2016-
campaign-security (discussing states covering security costs for state governors campaigning 
as presidential candidates out of state). 
 116  See, e.g., Stewart, supra note, 115. 
 117  See supra text accompanying notes 63–76. 
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coordinate closely during an election cycle.118  The United States Supreme 
Court has, on several occasions, emphasized the importance of voting in the 
democratic process.119  When articulating the importance of elections, it has 
placed emphasis on the importance of voter access to a campaign’s 
message.120  Because of the importance of informed voters, the Court has 
curtailed broadcast media rights to ensure candidates may purchase equal 
time for television commercials.121  In doing so, the Court has both explicitly 
and implicitly recognized the campaign, and its purpose to convey the 
candidate’s message to the voters, as an important tenant of the democratic 
process.122 
This analysis leads to one conclusion: the federal and state governments 
are directly involved in promoting a presidential candidate’s positions of the 
germane issues.  Under the joint action test, campaigns and government work 
in tandem for a common goal; here, that is the distribution of the candidate’s 
message to the public.  State or federal governments incur costs by providing 
security for candidates and securing the venues where candidates appear.123  
Campaigns are subject to a degree of control by the federal government 
through spending and contribution limits.124  Additionally, there would be no 
elected government without a general election and general elections cannot 
occur without candidates and campaigns.125  Since campaigns and the federal 
 
 118  Campaigns likely must be considered state actors even in federal elections.  The 
federal actor designation is extremely narrow.  See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 
U.S. 374, 400 (1995) (“[W]here, as here, the Government creates a corporation by special 
law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority 
to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the corporation is part of the 
Government for purposes of the First Amendment.”). 
 119  See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 587 (2000) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“Encouraging citizens to vote is a legitimate, indeed essential, state objective; 
for the constitutional order must be preserved by a strong, participatory democratic process.”); 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 233 (1982) (“[T]he right to vote is accorded extraordinary 
treatment because it is, in equal protection terms, an extraordinary right: a citizen cannot hope 
to achieve any meaningful degree of individual political equality if granted an inferior right 
of participation in the political process.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (declaring 
a state legislative scheme unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause asserting that 
the scheme harmed the right to have each vote weighted equally.). 
 120  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969) (“It is the right of the viewers 
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount [in an election].”) (citing 
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)); FCC v. Allentown Broad. 
Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361–62 (1955). 
 121  Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. 367 (holding the FCC can regulate airtime that 
broadcasters provide candidates to ensure voters were able to hear from all candidates). 
 122  Id.  But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (holding a state statute imposing 100-
foot boundary restriction on distribution of campaign materials on election day 
constitutional). 
 123  See Leventhal, supra note 115. 
 124  Castiglione, supra note 91, at 353. 
 125  See Reynolds, supra note 63.  
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government are intertwined, campaigns should comply with constitutional 
dictates.126 
IV. THE RIGHT OF ACCESS AND CAMPAIGNS 
Despite declining to hold that the press has privileges superior to that 
of the ordinary individual, the Court has recognized that the government may 
not discriminate between different members of the press.127  When it comes 
to accessing government buildings, courts have acknowledged that the press 
has a right of access and that the government may not discriminate between 
different news outlets.128 
A. The Right to Access: Newsgathering 
The right of access cases originated with the Press’s access to criminal 
trials.  In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, the Court held the public, and 
by extension the press, had a right of access to observe criminal trials under 
the First Amendment.129  The Court reasoned that freedoms of speech and 
the press shared “a common core purpose of assuring freedom of 
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”130  It 
considered open trials vital to the public’s ability to obtain information on 
the government.131  “[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news,” it 
reasoned, “freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”132  The Court 
therefore held that in places “traditionally open to the public” there was a 
“right of access.”133  In the context of criminal proceedings, the Court would 
 
 126  But see George F. Will, Elections and Campaigns Are Not the Same Thing, WASH. 
POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/elections-and-campaigns-
are-not-the-same-thing/2015/05/27/72d0ce42-03c6-11e5-a428-
c984eb077d4e_story.html?utm_term=.1a0e51896beb. 
 127  See Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 225 (1987) (holding that a 
tax on magazines that were not “religious, professional, trade or sports periodical[s]” was 
unconstitutional); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 576 (1983) (holding a special tax that applies only to certain newspapers 
unconstitutional.). 
 128  Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1984) (“Regulations which permit the 
Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated 
under the First Amendment.”). 
 129  448 U.S. 555 (1980).  The Court had previously held that the accused has the right to 
a public trial in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979).  Richmond Newspapers 
is significant in that it prevented a nongovernment actor (the accused) from closing his trial 
to the general public. 
 130  Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575. 
 131  Id. at 575–76 (“‘[The] First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the 
self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information 
from which members of the public may draw.’”) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
 132  Id. at 576. 
 133  Id. at 577. 
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go on to expand the right of access to hearings,134 criminal trials involving 
minors135 and voir dire.136  In doing so, the Court created a right of access in 
criminal trials subject only to the defendant’s right to a fair trial under the 
Sixth Amendment.137 
Lower courts seized upon the right of access and expanded it 
significantly to include areas outside the courtroom including “access [to] a 
wide range of civil and administrative government activities.”138  Under the 
Equal Protection Clause, courts granted access to government tax records,139 
legislative galleries,140 government press conferences141 and executions142 
that were previously opened only to select members of the press.143  In doing 
so, lower courts shifted the analysis from whether the general public could 
obtain access to whether other journalists had access when determining if 
there was a right of access.144  “Once unmoored from the Sixth 
Amendment[‘s protections]”145 the First Amendment began to assure “the 
public and the press equal access once the government has opened its 
doors.”146 
Despite this expansion, courts recognition that the right of access is 
“qualified, rather than absolute, and is subject to limiting considerations such 
as confidentiality, security, orderly process, spatial limitations, and doubtless 
 
 134  Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding the 
public had a right of access to a criminal preliminary hearing). 
 135  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (granting press access to a 
trial involving sexual assault on minors). 
 136  Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010); Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press 
Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (holding the right to access outweighed the government’s 
interest to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information). 
 137  Cristina Carmody Tilley, I Am a Camera: Scrutinizing the Assumption That Cameras 
in the Courtroom Furnish Public Value by Operating as a Proxy for the Public, 16 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 697 (2014). 
 138  Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2012).  See Dyk, supra note 48, at 944–
53.  
 139  McCoy v. Providence Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760, 765–66 (1st Cir. 1951). 
 140  Kovach v. Maddux, 2378 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Tenn. 1965). 
 141  Times-Picatune Publ’g Corp. v. Lee, Civil Action No. 88-1325, 1988 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3506 (E.D. La. Apr. 15, 1988); Borrec v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Haw. 1974). 
 142  Cal. First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 143  But see Ryan Benjamin Witte, It’s My News Too! Online Journalism and 
Discriminatory Access to the Congressional Periodical Press Gallery, 12 YALE J. L. & TECH. 
208 (2010) (arguing that the government should grant access to the Congressional Press 
Gallery for news bloggers).  
 144  Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (finding the right of 
“newsmen” to reasonable access to news of the government extends to access “to places where 
other members of the press may go and congregate in the ordinary course of events.  In other 
words, there is a limited First Amendment right of access to the public galleries, the press 
rooms, and the press conferences dealing with state government.”). 
 145  N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 298 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 146  Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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many others.”147  The Court has drawn several lines where the public’s right 
of access is curtailed.  For instance, it has distinguished closed-door sessions 
from open-door sessions of government, with the press allowed to access the 
latter but not the former.148  Safety and impeding the government’s ability to 
fulfill its purpose are also compelling reasons to restrict access of the 
press.149  Lower courts have expanded and defined these restrictions.  Public 
polling places, for example, are not considered public under right of access 
because of the individual citizen’s right to have a secret ballot.150  The 
military’s need for secrecy and concern for journalists’ safety led to denial 
of a “right” to embed reporters in military units.151  Most denials of right of 
access are based upon privacy rights and national security interests.152 
When granting the right of access, these private rights and national 
security interests are balanced against two important public policies 
necessary to maintain a democratic government.  First, the press acts as a 
watchdog and surrogate of the public.153  Through proximity, journalists 
build rapport with government officials, sources, and others in the industry 
to obtain information.154  The press, unlike the average person, has time to 
discover, organize, and distribute this information.  As stated by the Court, 
 
 147  Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Ga. 
1981). 
 148  Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833–34 (1974) (“Despite the fact that news gathering 
may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own 
conferences, the meetings of other official bodies gathering in executive session, and the 
meetings of private organizations have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime 
or disaster when the general public is excluded.”).  
 149  See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“[T]he prohibition of unauthorized entry 
into the White House diminishes the citizen’s opportunities to gather information he might 
find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry 
into the White House a First Amendment right.  The right to speak and publish does not carry 
with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”).  C.f. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 
684–85 (1972) (“Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or 
disaster when the general public is excluded . . . .”). 
 150  See PG Publ. Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]here is a very real 
possibility that the presence of reporters during the sign-in period, when individuals are 
necessarily exchanging personal information in preparation for casting a private vote, could 
concern, intimidate or even turn away potential voters.”). 
 151  Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 152  United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121 (2d. Cir 1995). 
 153  Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have 
observed that the news media, when asserting the right of access, are surrogates for the 
public . . . .  The free press is the guardian of the public interest, and the independent judiciary 
is the guardian of the free press.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 154  Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of 
Journalists’ Confidentiality, 1795–2005, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425 (2006); Elizabeth Coenia 
Sims, Reporters and Their Confidential Sources: How Judith Miller Represents the 
Continuing Disconnect Between the Courts and the Press, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 433, 433–
43 (2007). 
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“[w]ithout the information provided by the press most of us and many of our 
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions 
on the administration of government generally.”155  By acting as a surrogate 
and watchdog, the press conducts investigations and provides the results to 
the public.156  Thus, citizens gain an understanding of the workings of 
government. 
Second, the right of access forces government to be more accountable 
and open.157  In the context of a criminal trial proceeding, it “permits the 
public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process—an 
essential component in our structure of self-government.”158  Construing the 
right of access broadly “protects the public against the government’s 
‘arbitrary interference with access to important information.’”159  Using the 
press as a surrogate, “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the 
workings of public agencies . . . [and] the operation of government” is 
fulfilled.160 
In determining whether there is a right of access, courts apply a 
balancing test.161  Prior to applying the balancing test, however, the journalist 
must meet the two-part test that the Court articulated in Press Enterprise II.  
Under this test, courts must determine (1) “whether the place and process 
have historically been open to the press and general public”162 and (2) 
“whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of 
the particular process in question.”163  The first factor examines past practice 
by asking if there is “a tradition of opening to the press the matter in 
question.”164  If this first factor is present, there is a presumption in favor of 
access that can only be overcome by a narrow and specifically tailored 
governmental interest.165 
The second prong ensures that the press is not excluded from areas 
where the public would benefit from the knowledge gathered.  Courts review 
the government’s action to determine “whether public access plays a positive 
 
 155  Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975). 
 156  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 157  Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Open government has been a 
hallmark of our democracy since our nation’s founding.”). 
 158  Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). 
 159  N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 298 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 583 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
 160  Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 589 (1978). 
 161  PG Publ. Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 102 (3d Cir. 2013); Leigh, 677 F.3d at 899. 
 162  Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
 163  Id. at 9. 
 164  N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. United States, 836 F.3d 421, 428–29 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 165  United States v. Bulger, 283 F.R.D. 46, 59 (D. Mass. 2012). 
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role in the functioning of [the government], whether the [government] has 
demonstrated an overriding interest in the viewing restrictions, or whether 
the restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”166  In doing so, a 
court weighs the benefits achieved against the impairment of the public 
good.167  Factors courts have considered include: better analysis of the 
government’s policies, increased perceptions of fairness in government 
proceedings, serving as a check on corruption through public scrutiny, better 
government performance, and discouragement of fraud.168 
Regardless, the government cannot grant selective access to specific 
members of the press.169  Some courts have taken this to mean that granting 
access to a single reporter triggers a requirement to allow access to all 
journalists who meet reasonable criteria.170  Other courts have relied on the 
public forum doctrine in concluding that government cannot discriminate 
between different journalists or their viewpoints.171  This doctrine protects 
against a government entity which retaliates against a member of the press.172 
B. The Right of Access in the Campaign Context 
Since campaigns are state actors subject to the restraints of the 
Constitution, journalists and reporters have a right of access.173  Expanding 
the right to access to campaigns would promote the policy decisions behind 
this right: placing the press in a position to observe and report on the 
campaign’s activities and thereby opening the campaign to press scrutiny.  
To obtain a right of access, the press must meet both the historic prong and 
 
 166  Leigh, 677 F.3d at 900. 
 167  PG Publ. Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 111 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 168  Id.  (“[1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing the 
public with the more complete understanding of the [proceeding]; [2] promotion of the public 
perception of fairness which can be achieved only by permitting full public view of the 
proceedings; [3] providing a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for 
community concern, hostility and emotion; [4] serving as a check on corrupt practices by 
exposing the [proceeding] to public scrutiny; [5] enhancement of the performance of all 
involved; and [6] discouragement of [fraud].”) (quoting United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 
839 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 169  Milligan, supra note 20, at 1109–11. 
 170  Getty Images News. Serv. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2002).  
But see Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 171  Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (quoting Perry 
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ.’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
 172  McBride v. Vill. of Michiana, 100 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Although no 
Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit decisions had, at that time, applied time-honored First 
Amendment principles to a situation specifically involving governmental retaliation against a 
news reporter, relevant pre-existing case law made the illegality of such retaliation 
apparent.”). 
 173  See discussion supra Part III. 
MESCALL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/25/2018  5:37 PM 
1672 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1653 
the positive role prong of the Press Enterprise II test.174 
1. The History of the Press and Presidential Campaigns 
The press has influenced the presidency from the very beginning.175  By 
harnessing the power of the press, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and other 
Founding Fathers were able to sway Americans to support independence 
from Great Britain.176  Shortly before Alexander Hamilton and Thomas 
Jefferson created the Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties, 
newspapers spread their political ideas.177  Soon “politicians and parties 
looked to newspapers as their primary public combatants in the bruising 
battles that came after the Jefferson-Hamilton split.”178  When Jefferson won 
the presidential election of 1800 with the support of a loose, but large 
network of newspapers, “it was more or less accepted that no serious political 
movement or presidential candidacy could afford to be without a newspaper 
network.”179 
For roughly a century thereafter, newspapers were highly partisan.  
Editors who supported the victorious presidential candidate were often 
granted appointments in the new administration.180  Eventually, presidential 
campaigns and parties organized effectively enough to bypass the press and 
communicate their messages directly to the people via speaking tours.181  
Towards the end of the 19th Century, presidential campaigns began 
“systemic organization of communication tactics” aimed at voters.182  By the 
1896 presidential election, both Republican and Democratic candidates 
organized “campaign headquarters, national speaking tours and produced 
written pamphlets meant to ‘educate’ voters” without press involvement.183 
 
 
 174  Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). 
 175  See RICHARD M. PERLOFF, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION: POLITICS, PRESS, AND PUBLIC 
IN AMERICA, 16–17 (2008) (“Anyone who thinks that George Washington, the heroic general 
of the Revolution, the legendary father of his country, got a free ride from the American press 
should think again.  George Washington got gored by the newspapers of his era.”). 
 176  Jeffery L. Pasley, The Role of the Press and Media in American Presidential Elections, 
ACADEMIA (2009), https://www.academia.edu/5338845/The_Role_of_the_Press_and_Media
_in_Presidential_Elections (“John Adams, Samuel Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander 
Hamilton, and others had made heavy use of the press in the movement for independence 
from Great Britain . . . .”). 
 177  Id. at 4. 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id.  
 180  Id. at 5–8. 
 181  Id. at 8. 
 182  Austin Corthell, Public Relations and Politics: Background and Contemporary 
Practice, LITERATURE REVIEW AND CASE STUDIES, at 4 (Aug. 13, 2008), 
https://prtalkingpoints.files.wordpress.com/2008/10/public-relations-and-politics.doc. 
 183  Id. 
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Nevertheless, the press, initially through newspapers and later by radio 
and television, continued to play a role in presidential elections.184  Starting 
with President Theodore Roosevelt’s campaign in 1904, members of the 
press rode with presidential candidates in their railway cars.185  While 
members of the press had their own car, the candidates made themselves 
available for questions and held press conferences between stops.186  This 
tradition of the press accompanying the candidate eventually evolved into 
the modern press bus where the campaign provides buses the press may use 
to follow a presidential candidate’s speaking tour.187 
The press has been an integral part of the election process in America 
since the passage of the First Amendment.  The modern tradition of press 
access to a presidential campaign, while not as old as the Constitution, has 
existed for more than 100 years.  The next question is therefore whether the 
electoral process benefits from analyses provided by multiple news outlets. 
2. The Importance and Benefits of Press Access 
Diverse viewpoints on a presidential campaign are crucial to ensuring 
proper scrutiny of presidential candidates.188  Data suggests that individual 
newspaper outlets provide different campaign coverage.189  In their research 
on campaign election coverage, Daron Shaw and Bartholomew Sparrow 
argue that there is an “inner ring” and “outer ring” of press coverage.190  The 
inner ring is composed of well-known traditional media outlets such as the 
New York Times and Washington Post, while the outer ring is composed of 
new media and smaller regional outlets.191  While the amount of coverage 
 
 184  See id. (“Print media dominated political campaigns until the advent of radio (1928) 
and television (1952).”) 
 185  See generally TIMOTHY CROUSE, THE BOYS ON THE BUS, COMING TO POWER (1972) 
(discussing the advent of the press bus).   
 186  Id.  
 187  See Jim Dickerson, Covering the Presidential Campaign: The View from the Press 
Bus, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 5, 2007), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publicat
ion/2008/05/20080523105359wrybakcuh0.8072168.html#axzz4WA9yB1X3 [https://we
b.archive.org/web/20151014071445/http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2
008/05/20080523105359wrybakcuh0.8072168.html]. 
 188  Why You Should Care About Media Diversity, THE LEADERSHIP CONF.  (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.civilrights.org/media/ownership/care.html [https://web.archive.or
g/web/20170515121551/http://www.civilrights.org/media/ownership/care.html] (“Media 
remains a critical element in achieving equal opportunity and full participation in civic life.  
Media shapes public views of minority communities as well as views on the causes and scope 
of social problems and the best solutions.  Thus, access to the media by the broadest sector of 
society is crucial to ensuring that diverse viewpoints are presented to the American people, 
and that all sectors of society are accurately depicted.”).  
 189  Daron R. Shaw & Bartholomew H. Sparrow, From the Inner Ring Out: News 
Congruence, Cue-Taking, and Campaign Coverage, 52 POL. RES. Q. 323 (1999). 
 190  Id. at 330. 
 191  Id. 
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dedicated to specific campaign issues did not vary between inner ring and 
outer ring news organizations, interpretation and support for the candidates’ 
stances on those issues did differ.192  This supports a simple proposition: the 
media is not a single conglomerate.  Regional, ideological, and editorial 
opinions all influence coverage of a single candidate.193 
Campaigns, meanwhile, have many of the same objectives that the 
government has when it releases information, namely the desire to “transmit 
a message that persuades skeptics and mobilizes supporters.”194  The conflict 
between the candidate’s need to spread his message, combined with the 
media’s discretion to publish as it pleases, often creates a rancorous 
relationship between media outlets and campaigns.195  Media distortion is 
something that candidates fear and campaigns are “engaged in a constant 
effort to convince the mass media to reflect their own campaign agendas in 
the hopes of influencing public opinion.”196  As the media asserts its own, 
independent view of the candidate’s message, candidates may become 
increasingly exasperated at the media’s effective refusal to spread the 
candidate’s message.197 
The multiple viewpoints and political discourse the press fosters are 
necessary to allow voters to make a meaningful determination regarding 
presidential candidates.198  Conservative analysis of a liberal candidate’s 
platform may be critical, while a liberal analysis may praise the same 
platform.199  Candidates restricting one, but not the other, effectively engage 
 
 192  Id. at 343 (“In short, editors of the outer ring newspapers appear to manifest news 
priorities different from those in the inner ring, an observation that casts some doubt on the 
phenomena of cue-taking among the nation’s newspapers.”). 
 193  Id. (“This research suggests that the news media cannot be assumed to be a 
monolith.”). 
 194  Danny Hayes, The Dynamics of Agenda Convergence and the Paradox of 
Competitiveness in Presidential Campaigns, 63 POL. RES. Q. 594, 595 (2010). 
 195  Id.  
 196  Id. at 596. 
 197  C.f. id. at 606 (“Electoral competition produces many benefits for the political system 
but the accurate representation of candidate discourse by the mass media is not one of 
them . . . .  Competition draws the media’s attention, but the content of the ensuing coverage 
is not likely to help voters make informed judgments.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 198  See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (“[The] public 
interest standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles and, in 
particular, to the First Amendment goal of achieving the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources . . . .”) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted); Akilah N. Folami, Deschooling the News Media-Democratizing Civic Discourse, 
34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 489, 503 (2012) (“[P]olitical news and discourse should be deemed 
as a public good that is essential to the maintenance of America’s self-governing democracy.  
It needs, as a result, to be sustained by a democratic infrastructure that promotes its open and 
inclusive production, again with consumer sovereignty considered and encouraged but not 
solely determinative.”).  
 199  See Dan Bernhardt, et al., Political Polarization and the Electoral Effects of Media 
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in viewpoint discrimination.200  A banished reporter may be able to obtain 
press releases via other news sources, but the journalist cannot evaluate the 
new information on a first hand basis.201  Thus, an extension of First 
Amendment protection to a right of access to presidential campaigns is 
warranted. 
V. THE ENUMERATED REASONS RULE: POLICY REASONS FOR 
ADOPTION 
This Comment advocates the adoption of the Enumerated Reasons Rule 
(the Rule).  The Rule is simple; a campaign must provide a list of 
requirements necessary for a journalist to obtain a press pass.  If a campaign 
denies a member of the press access to the campaign, the campaign must 
provide its rationale for denying or revoking access.  The Rule is 
substantially functionalist and some courts have essentially applied the Rule 
in right of access cases.202 
A. The Courts and the Rule 
The Rule is best illustrated in Sherrill v. Knight.203  Sherrill, a journalist, 
applied for and was denied a White House press pass by the Secret Service.204  
When the Secret Service denied Sherrill’s request for a press pass, it had no 
articulated criteria regarding the issuance of a press pass and did not provide 
a reason for its refusal to grant the credential.205  After the denial, Sherrill 
sued and argued that the Secret Service violated his First and Fifth 
Amendment rights.206 
 
 
 
Bias, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1092, 1102 (2008) (“The fundamental reason for the inefficiency in 
electoral outcomes is that voters choose to listen to biased media.  This effect is likely to be 
quite stable, even though the population as a whole would be better off if media reported 
unbiased news.  In principle, voters could become completely informed even with two biased 
media, by listening to both.”). 
 200  C.f. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 894 (1995) 
(“[T]he prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that important purpose of the Free 
Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing public debate.”). 
 201  Jonathan Peters, One in Five Journalists Has Had a Credential Request Denied, COL. 
JOURNALISM REV. (2014), (citing Hermes et al., supra note 7). http://www.cjr.org/uni
ted_states_project/survey_one_in_five_journalists_has_had_credential_request_denied.php. 
 202  Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[The White House] must 
publish or otherwise make publicly known the actual standard employed in determining 
whether an otherwise eligible journalist will obtain a White House press pass.”). 
 203  Id. 
 204  Id. at 126. 
 205  Id.  
 206  Id. at 128. 
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The D.C. Circuit, on appeal, held that the Secret Service “must publish 
or otherwise make publicly known the actual standard employed in 
determining whether an otherwise eligible journalist will obtain a White 
House press pass.”207  Addressing the Secret Service’s argument that the 
White House is not open to the public and therefore there is no right of 
access, the court found the “White House press facilities [were] made 
publicly available as a source of information for newsmen,” and “the 
protection afforded newsgathering under the first amendment guarantee of 
freedom of the press” could not be “denied arbitrarily or for less than 
compelling reasons.”208 
The D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Sherrill provides a balance between the 
need of the public to have access to news, while still allowing the executive 
branch to control who has access to the White House.209  It is “at its heart, 
functionalist . . . [w]ith the goal of maximizing public discourse . . . .”210  It 
ensures that viewpoint discrimination, arbitrarily denying access, and 
frustrating press attempts to obtain information meant for public 
consumption will not survive judicial scrutiny.211  The decision, however, 
did not go so far as to demand that the Secret Service or President provide 
access to all reporters.212  The President and his staff, for example, still had 
complete discretion to grant or deny interviews to the press.213 
Other courts have applied similar reasoning in the campaign context.  
In WPIX, Incorporated v. League of Women Voters, WPIX, a small media 
outlet, demanded access to a presidential debate.214  The League allowed 
access to the event only if all news channels were willing to pool resources 
and use a single feed.215  WPIX refused to join the pool and filed an 
injunction demanding its own cameras be granted access to the debate.216  
After determining that the League was a state actor and the First Amendment 
right of access applied, the court reasoned that granting access to WPIX 
would invariably lead to other news organizations requesting physical 
access, thus jeopardizing the safety and security of the event.217  By denying 
 
 207  Id. at 130. 
 208  Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129. 
 209  See Milligan, supra note 20, at 1107. 
 210  Id.  
 211  See Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129–30 (“Not only newsmen and the publications for which 
they write, but also the public at large have an interest protected by the first amendment in 
assuring that restrictions on newsgathering be no more arduous than necessary, and that 
individual newsmen not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of information.”).  
 212  Milligan, supra note 20, at 1107. 
 213  Id. 
 214  595 F. Supp. 1484, 1485 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 215  Id. at 1486. 
 216  Id. at 1489–91. 
 217  Id. 
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access to the debate, the court in WPIX, applied a balancing test between “the 
interests to be served by the newsgathering activity at issue” against “the 
interest served by the denial of that activity.”218 
Other courts have recognized the harm that arises when the government 
does not provide reasons for exclusion.219  These issues become prominent 
when there is limited space to house and maintain a press pool.220  When 
there is no published list of rules, priorities or requirements for the press, 
then journalists cannot take steps to correct their applications.221  So while 
an agency’s decision may not be arbitrary or discriminatory, without 
enumerated reasons for denial, the reporter cannot correct the issues with his 
application and the judiciary cannot review the government’s decision.222  
Alternatively, having an express policy allows courts to better understand 
and efficiently deal with injunctions concerning denials of access.223 
B. The Functionalist Approach: Application of the Enumerated 
Reasons Rule 
Requiring campaigns to publish requirements for press credentials will 
allow courts to better balance the benefits and consequences of granting 
access.  While the Rule does not compel campaigns to grant candidate 
interviews, it will avoid some of the pitfalls of allowing the campaign to have 
complete discretion to whom it grants press credentials.  In particular, the 
Rule will (1) prevent judicial overreach, (2) promote diverse viewpoints of a 
candidate, and (3)  not overburden campaigns. 
 
 
 
 
 218  Id. at 1489 (citing Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 
1245 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Borreca v. Fasi 369 F. Supp. 906, 909 (D. Haw. 1974)). 
 219  See Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116, 147 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Exclusion of an 
individual reporter also carries with it ‘the danger [that] granting favorable treatment to certain 
members of the media . . . allows the government to influence the type of substantive media 
coverage that public events will receive,’ which effectively harms the public.”) (quoting 
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1986)). 
 220  Getty Images News Servs. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 221  Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[P]rocedural requirements of 
notice of the factual bases for denial, an opportunity for the applicant to respond to these, and 
a final written statement of the reasons for denial are compelled by the foregoing 
determination that the interest of a bona fide Washington correspondent in obtaining a White 
House press pass is protected by the first amendment.”).  
 222  See id. 
 223  See Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing the complaint 
after examining the government agency’s press policy). 
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1. The Rule and Judicial Overreach 
As a basic premise of American government, courts should not replace 
the legislature as the primary lawmaking authority through their rulemaking 
and constitutional powers.224  Indeed, many legal scholars have concluded 
that the courts should be a last resort for any new law, as the constitutional 
framework encourages the legislative and executive branches to tackle 
problems instead.225  Nevertheless, it is “the core purpose of the federal 
courts in vindicating constitutional rights.”226  Given the history and purpose 
of both the right of access and the state actor test, it is natural to extend these 
rights to campaigns.227 
The Rule’s primary purpose is to prevent judicial overreach.228  As this 
rule was created by the D.C. Circuit, its application to executive agencies 
illustrates how courts would likely apply the rule to campaigns.  D.C. Circuit 
opinions229 essentially “[balance] the benefits of transparency with some 
other factor . . . .”230  While providing deference to the needs of the 
 
 224  See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Nor does this conclusion [that 
the Constitution is superior to statute] by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to 
the legislative power.  It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and 
that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of 
the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather 
than the former.  They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than 
by those which are not fundamental.”).  
 225  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“This Court, 
limited in function in accordance with that premise, does not serve its high purpose when it 
exceeds its authority . . . .  [When] the Court adds something to the Constitution . . . the Court 
in reality substitutes its view of what should be so for the amending process.”).  See also Brent 
G. McCune, Judicial Overreach and America’s Declining Democratic Voice: The Same-Sex 
Marriage Decisions, 20 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 29, 75–76 (2015) (“It seems the people should 
always be able to decide matters of such importance as our nation’s fundamental rights and 
liberties.  After all, ‘the right to make law rests in the people and flows to the government, not 
the other way around.’  Another disturbing belief is that ‘the Constitution stands for the 
proposition that some rights aren’t left to the whims of a democratic majority.’  This implies 
that it is preferable to place those cherished rights in the hands of five judges and their whims.  
This cannot be the ideal the Founding Fathers intended for our Nation.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 226  Daniel Breen, Avoiding “Wild Blue Yonders”: The Prudentialism of Henry J. Friendly 
and John Roberts, 52 S.D. L. REV. 73, 111 (2007). 
 227  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 228  See Milligan, supra note 20, at 1107–08 (“[Sherrill] did not impede on ‘the discretion 
of the President to grant interviews or briefings with selected journalists.’  The panel observed 
that ‘[i]t would certainly be unreasonable to suggest that because the President allows 
interviews with some bona fide journalists, he must give this opportunity to all.’”) (quoting 
Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (1977)). 
 229  Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d 
94 (D.D.C. 2003); Getty Images News Servs. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 
2002). 
 230  Derigan Silver, Power, National Security and Transparency: Judicial Decision 
Making and Social Architecture in the Federal Courts, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 129, 160 (2010). 
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executive, “most judges were unwilling to abdicate their judicial function 
and took their duty to protect civil liberties seriously, often attempting to 
balance transparency with national security.”231  In effect, the rule prevents 
“bad forms of selective access (say, press conferences, when equal access 
was not thought to discourage grants of access) and, at the same time, permit 
good forms of selective access (say, exclusive interviews, when equal access 
was thought to discourage grants of access).”232 
Requiring presidential campaigns to provide criteria for evaluating 
press credential applications allows courts to more easily balance the 
concerns of press access and campaign messaging.  Courts applying the rule 
tend to defer to the entity laying down the rule.233  Interpreting the 
campaign’s own rules, the courts would examine them to determine if the 
criteria is reasonable234 and its application fair.235  Additionally, courts will 
look to see if a campaign’s rules favor a specific viewpoint or overtly 
discriminate due to ideology.236  In limiting court review to these areas, the 
Rule ensures that the judiciary will not overburden itself or the campaign it 
is scrutinizing. 
2. The Rule and the Campaign’s Message 
Another concern is that the campaign will not be able to control its 
message.  A campaign’s purpose is to ensure that the public learns about the 
candidate and the media can disrupt or distort the candidate’s message.237  
Campaigns argue that media outlets that untruthfully or unfairly “spin” the 
candidate’s words should not be permitted to continue such behavior.238 
 
 231  Id. at 168. 
 232  Milligan, supra note 20, at 1107 (internal quotations omitted). 
 233  See Getty Images News Servs. v. Dep’t of Def., 193 F. Supp. 2d 112, 119 (D.D.C. 
2002) (noting that the military is entitled to “heightened deference”). 
 234  Nation Magazine v. Dep’t of Def., 762 F. Supp. 1558, 1574 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The 
activities of the press are subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.”) 
(citing Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972)). 
 235  See Getty Images News Servs., 193 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (“[The Department of 
Defense’s] current approach, which involves making determinations about, inter alia, the 
relative audience sizes of media organizations based primarily upon the general knowledge 
of a D[epartment of Defense ] official without any published criteria or process for obtaining 
relevant information, strikes the Court as somewhat short of ‘reasonable.’”). 
 236  See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 
(2010) (holding that a viewpoint-neutral rule does not violate the First Amendment).  But see 
JB Pictures v. Dep’t of Def., 86 F.3d 236, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[I]f plaintiffs’ theory of 
‘viewpoint discrimination’ were accepted, virtually any restriction on access to government 
facilities . . . would be vulnerable to challenge on grounds of ‘viewpoint discrimination.’  
Such a move would represent a complete transformation . . . on access to government 
operations not historically open to the public.”).  
 237  See generally Hayes, supra note 194. 
 238  Jonathan Easly, Trump Fundraises Off ‘Liberal Media’ Attacks, THE HILL (Aug. 11, 
2016, 1:41 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/fundraising/291142-trump-fundraises-
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Applying the Rule against this argument, a court must weigh the 
benefits to the press and American people against the harm done to the 
campaign by the press.239  As discussed above, viewpoints of presidential 
candidates by press members are diverse due to region, editorial makeup, 
and ideology.240  The American people, meanwhile, are limiting themselves 
to news organizations that support their ideological preferences.241  
Americans are therefore receiving their news from a finite number of 
subjective viewpoints rather than multiple viewpoints or a broad “objective” 
one.242  In order to keep Americans informed, the courts should favor press 
access over the campaign’s desire to control its message. 
While there is a chance that news outlets would abuse the Rule, 
campaigns still have significant power to counter such abuses.243  Campaign 
personnel would retain the right to give special access, interviews, first 
opportunity to publish leaks, and off record comments to members of the 
media that favor the campaign’s purpose.244  The Rule does not disrupt these 
tactics.245  Campaigns will still be allowed to reward outlets that write 
favorably about their candidates with special interviews.246  Additionally, 
with modern social media platforms, the campaign can sidestep the press 
altogether and bring its message directly to the people.247  The Rule prevents 
 
off-liberal-media-attacks. 
 239  Silver, supra note 230 (discussing how courts balance national security interests 
against the interest of press access). 
 240  Shaw & Sparrow, supra note 189. 
 241  How Americans Get Their News, THE AMERICAN PRESS INST. (Mar. 14, 2014), https://
www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/how-americans-get-
news/. 
 242  See id.; Mitchell, supra note 2.  
 243  See Glenn Halbrooks, How Politicians Use Media to Win Elections, THE BALANCE 
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.thebalance.com/how-politicians-use-media-to-win-elections-
2315204 (listing ways presidential campaigns use the media). 
 244  See Friedman, supra note 26, at 290 (“[In Snyder v. Ringgold, No. 97-1358, 1998 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 562 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998)] [t]he plaintiff asserted a broad right to 
equal access to government information sources and similar treatment to other journalists . . . 
would preclude exclusive interviews, the common practice of officials declining to speak to 
reporters whom they see as untrustworthy because they have violated confidentiality or 
distorted their comments, or selective access to the White House.  As a result, plaintiff’s claim 
would alter long-accepted journalistic practice, suggesting that it is not a clearly established 
right.”).  
 245  See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (1977) (“Nor is the discretion of the President 
to grant interviews or briefings with selected journalists challenged.  It would certainly be 
unreasonable to suggest that because the President allows interviews with some bona fide 
journalists, he must give this opportunity to all.”) 
 246  See Mulligan, supra note 20, at 1107–08 (“[Sherrill] did not impede on ‘the discretion 
of the President to grant interviews or briefings with selected journalists.’ The panel observed 
that ‘[i]t would certainly be unreasonable to suggest that because the President allows 
interviews with some bona fide journalists, he must give this opportunity to all.’”). 
 247  See generally JOHN ALLEN HENDRICKS AND DAN SCHILL, PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNING 
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only an outright ban or removal of certain press entities.248  In effect, it 
balances the relationship between the press and the campaign, and eliminates 
the campaign’s ability to banish a particular news outlet based solely on its 
coverage of a candidate.249 
3. The Rule and the Burden on the Campaign 
Critics of the Rule could contend that it places too heavy of a burden 
on a campaign.  First, they could argue that it subjects the campaigns to 
extensive litigation.250  Second, they could claim that under the press-as-a-
technology interpretation of the Press Clause (which courts have effectively 
adopted)251 expansion of the right of access means any individual can request 
and successfully obtain a press pass.252  The Rule addresses both scenarios. 
The expansion of the right of access will not place onerous litigation 
burdens on the courts or the campaigns.  For one, access will be determined 
by injunction rather than extensive litigation.253  Once determined by the 
grant or denial of an injunction, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel will prevent re-litigation of the issue in multiple jurisdictions.254  
Finally, the onus of litigation will be placed on the campaign.255  If the 
campaign drafts and abides by sufficiently reasonable and fair criteria, then 
the court will not interfere.256  In effect, the campaign can limit the amount 
of litigation it engages in. 
The Rule allows the campaign to set its own requirements.  A campaign 
may set aside press passes for those entities with certain levels of readership 
or viewership, reserve credentials for a certain number of national, regional, 
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and local news outlets, or place a limit on the total number of press passes 
available.257  As courts have explained when applying the Rule, safety, size, 
and the amount of resources available to the campaign are all valid reasons 
for a campaign to structure its requirements.258  These reasons can effectively 
and validly limit access.259  The public’s right of access may be limited to 
the institutional press, thus preventing everyone from obtaining press 
credentials.  Additionally, courts have already adopted standards for 
determining who is a member of the press when applying the right of access 
to government entities.260  Courts could rely on these precedents in denying 
access to members of the public who do not work for a media outlet.261  The 
Rule therefore adequately balances the burdens and rights that arise when 
granting the First Amendment’s right of access to the press when following 
campaigns. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The public cannot be properly informed without the press.  As 
ideological shifts shape American politics and media choice, the press must 
have access to press credentials and campaign press conferences.  
Presidential campaigns are subject to the First Amendment because they are 
state actors that are sufficiently intertwined with government through the 
electoral system and federal regulation and support.  Therefore, the right of 
access to government buildings and press conferences applies to presidential 
campaigns.  As campaigns are interested in promoting their messages, courts 
should apply a balancing test and require campaigns to set definitive and 
reasonable guidelines to obtain a press pass.  In doing so, courts will ensure 
that reporters are not discriminated against because of their ideological 
leanings and will promote multiple viewpoints of a presidential candidate. 
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